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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the state of commercial development and resource management on Indigenous land, 
particularly in remote Australia. Indigenous landowners control signifi cant assets—over one million square 
kilometres of land—often with substantial resource rights and income earning potential. 
The levels of inactivity and missed opportunities on Indigenous land are of such magnitude as to represent a 
major risk for Indigenous landowning communities in terms of their future economic and social well-being, 
and also for the national interest in terms of ecological vulnerability and the social and political costs of 
Indigenous disadvantage. 
In this paper we explore the role of government as risk manager in such circumstances and outline the 
principles that must underpin any intervention program targeted to the commercial development of 
Indigenous land. Using the framework for profi t-related loans recently developed by Chapman and Simes 
(2004) and elements of an existing venture capital support program, the Innovation Investment Fund 
Program, we outline a new investment scheme to assist development and natural resource management on 
the growing Indigenous estate. The proposed scheme can be conceptualised as a profi t-related loan scheme 
or as a form of capped public investment. Our proposal addresses key elements of the market failure in the 
fi nancing of development on Indigenous land and provides incentives for greater private sector investment. 
It ensures that commercial and social risks are shared equitably between government, private sector investors 
and Indigenous-owned corporations in order to avoid problems of adverse selection or moral hazard.
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INTRODUCTION: THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
Over the past 30 years, land rights have become an established component of the institutional architecture of Australia. Land rights legislation providing for the transfer to Indigenous ownership of 
varying proportions of the erstwhile public estate exists in all States except Western Australia, and in the 
Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory. Following the High Court’s Mabo decision in 1992, the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cwlth) (NTA) was enacted, and it too is having an increasingly expansionary impact on 
the extent of Indigenous land ownership nationally. 
Governments have also instituted long-term acquisition programs that aim to return some proportion of 
the alienated estate to Indigenous ownership (Pollack 2001). Lands held under freehold or leasehold titles 
are generally not available for claim and transfer under land rights or native title legislation. The Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) were established at the national 
level in 1995 to provide a means to purchase such land for dispossessed Indigenous groups (Altman & 
Pollack 2001). Over the past 30 years, the combined impact of these developments has seen the transfer 
to Indigenous Australians of an area approaching 20 per cent of the Australian continental landmass. This 
percentage is set to grow incrementally in the future as further claims under the NTA statutory framework 
are determined and the ILC continues its acquisition program. Collectively, this land will be termed here the 
‘Indigenous estate’.
There have been two unintended and unanticipated effects of these land transfers: limited development in 
mainstream commercial terms and the emergence of a natural and cultural resource management (NCRM) 
gap in relation to Indigenous-owned land. The underlying assumption in Australia is that landowners have 
responsibility for land and resource management, usually as a by-product of the commercial utilisation 
of the land. This assumption can be problematic; for example, in the Murray–Darling Basin in south-east 
Australia commercial use of land has been accompanied by environmental degradation (Quiggin 2001). It is 
particularly problematic in remote Indigenous Australia because the commercial utilisation that is meant to 
underwrite NCRM is largely absent, although it is also true that the pressures on the environment are more 
limited and some bio-regions are remarkably intact.
Indigenous landowners face particular challenges. Indigenous communities in remote and very remote regions 
are clearly among the most disadvantaged segments of the Australian community (ABS 2004a, 2004b) and 
the causes of this disadvantage are complex and deep-seated. Much of the land under Indigenous ownership 
is not commercially viable in terms of old-economy agricultural or pastoral use.1 In some situations the 
land available for claim is degraded and faces long-standing feral animal or weed infestation problems and 
future risks. Arguably, Australian governments have historically under-invested in the management of these 
Crown lands that are now being transferred to Indigenous ownership, and this has exacerbated the situation 
Indigenous landowners now face. 
2 ALTMAN & DILLON
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
There is clearly a major gap in the public policy landscape in Australia that provides three very compelling 
arguments for intervention. First, there is the international citizenship case—investment in biodiversity 
conservation and environmental sustainability is needed to maintain Australia’s international obligations. 
Second, there is the related national interest case—there are strong public good arguments for ensuring 
that the fi fth of the continent under Indigenous ownership is managed effectively, especially given its 
high biodiversity and conservation value (Australian State of the Environment Committee 2001). There 
is an associated national interest in maintaining at least a minimum level of population density across 
the continent.
The fi nal and most compelling argument, in our view, because of its focus on people, is the political and 
policy imperative to see Indigenous communities reducing their high levels of poverty, welfare dependence 
and social disadvantage by utilising this land asset profi tably. The degree of diffi culty for the nation of 
this last challenge is set to rise exponentially over the next 20 years as demographic growth trends for 
Indigenous communities show remote community populations increasing rapidly beyond the capacity of 
existing infrastructure and service delivery models (Taylor 2003).
The key element underpinning Indigenous disadvantage can be characterised as market failure relating 
to the disjunction between the Indigenous land base and the broader market economy. This disjunction 
arises from a range of factors. Perhaps the most obvious is the ownership status of most of the Indigenous 
estate—group ownership and inalienable tenure inhibit access to private sector capital. Land cannot be 
used as security, and commercial banks are understandably reluctant to lend to Indigenous interests without 
realisable collateral. 
While this is an issue relating to transactions costs and not to inalienability (since Indigenous landowners 
under existing land rights statutes can in fact lease their lands, negotiate land use agreements, or surrender 
tenure to the crown), the bottom line is that Indigenous landowners have generally not been able to leverage 
their major land assets into signifi cant commercial benefi ts.2 This problem is exacerbated by the remoteness 
of many communities, their relatively small size—on the Indigenous estate the estimated Indigenous 
population of only 120,000 is spread across over 1,000 communities (Altman 2004a)—and the lack of a 
commercial banking presence in most communities. Institutional and governance issues within Indigenous 
land-owning or land-managing organisations are also substantial barriers to successful commercial 
enterprises on Indigenous land (Altman 2004b).
Other factors that reinforce this market failure might be characterised as state or policy failure. These 
include low investments by governments, both historically and today, in basic infrastructure on the 
Indigenous estate; poor educational and health service delivery outcomes leading to educational and skills 
defi cits within Indigenous communities; and poor incentive structures and poverty traps that often lead to 
severe and deep-seated welfare dependence and associated social dysfunction. All have current and future 
costs to Indigenous people and the nation.
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THE INDIGENOUS LAND ‘INVESTMENT DEFICIT’ AS RISK
A consequence of the institutional architecture facing Indigenous landowners is that Indigenous land is 
often under-developed. It receives minimal or no land management public investment, and is vulnerable 
to ecological or environmental degradation. We term this the Indigenous land ‘investment defi cit’. While 
this investment defi cit is a potential problem for Indigenous landowners, it is also a concern for contiguous 
bio-regions that abut Aboriginal land, especially national parks and pastoral properties. It exacerbates 
environmental and ecological risks in areas such as biodiversity conservation, bio-security, feral species 
control, weed eradication and uncontrolled bushfi res. 
The most serious risks associated with the institutional architecture that presently exists on Indigenous land 
are the generalised social and political risks deriving from the substantial absence of economic development 
activity and the concomitant costs of dependency and social dysfunction. There is also a range of contingent 
risks related to ‘opportunity benefi ts’ or missed opportunities. These opportunities involve both private 
(Indigenous) and public benefi ts. An obvious example is the potential for carbon abatement and for 
potential trading regimes that rely on Indigenous fi re management in the savannas (see Appendix A). Other 
contingent risks arise from poorly defi ned institutional arrangements and property rights, particularly where 
there are intersections between customary rights recognised in statute or common law and commercial 
rights vested in third parties.3
Altman (2004a) has argued that part of the reason for policy and state failure in relation to Indigenous 
development relates to inadequate analysis and conceptual understanding of the particular form that 
Indigenous economies take in remote and very remote situations—these are not standard two-sector 
economies, but have a third and distinct customary sector. The ‘hybrid economy’ framework highlights the 
existence of customary, market and state sectors and a high degree of articulation (or overlap) between 
them. A failure to recognise the contemporary interplay of kin-based and market-based economies results 
in inappropriate policy frameworks. Overall, the risks associated with the Indigenous land investment defi cit 
involve signifi cant potential costs to the nation, and deserve policy attention by governments at all levels.
It is clear that, despite the existing market failure, Indigenous landowners stand to benefi t from public sector 
intervention that underwrites or facilitates improved management of their land and resources. They can 
expect to maintain links to traditional sites and estates, and this may bring concomitant cultural and social 
health benefi ts. They can also expect to achieve greater autonomy and economic independence, increased 
commercial leverage and political infl uence4 and, in some cases, commercial benefi ts in terms of increased 
income, employment and profi ts. It follows that there is a case for an Indigenous contribution to any public 
sector funded economic development or NCRM initiatives, including sharing the commercial risks involved 
at the corporate level.
Devising means by which Indigenous landowners might share these risks is not altogether straightforward. 
Indigenous land is generally held communally (refl ecting the underlying group-based nature of Indigenous 
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land ownership systems), yet the corporations set up to hold land are rarely fi nancially robust and are often 
subject to internal politicking.5 The market failure associated with inalienable title presents a formidable 
barrier to accessing capital markets for fi nance. Individual landowners do not have authority to act 
unilaterally and mostly do not have the fi nancial resources to make signifi cant investment contributions in 
development projects—individuals have limited incentives and capacity to invest. 
One question to be faced is how to develop expertise and entrepreneurial skills in an organisational 
framework that works in partnership with, and complements, the skills and capacities of landowners in 
managing country. Cultural and customary relations often work to reduce incentives for individuals to 
pursue commercial opportunities because kin-based relations of production operate to skim off any surplus 
accumulated by an individual. At the communal level, competition between land-owning factions operates 
to negate the potential gains from co-operative behaviour.6 At the organisational level, opportunities 
abound for unethical activity that can strip resources out of corporate entities, often benefi ting non-
Indigenous employees to the disadvantage of the local community.
The challenge facing public policy makers is to devise a program that addresses the gap in commercial 
development and land management on Indigenous land in a way that recognises the existence of both 
market failure and parallel state failure. Such a program must build on the comparative advantage of 
Indigenous landowners in local economies and ensure they share a proportion of the risks, while overcoming 
the structural constraints facing landowners in relation to access to fi nance.
There is the potential for landowners to leverage themselves into investments in a wide range of commercial 
businesses (stores, road maintenance work, tourism enterprises), in service delivery functions of various kinds 
(e.g. government housing and aged person care programs) and in innovative landcare and land management 
enterprises such as bio-prospecting, commercial utilisation of wildlife, and the provision of ‘eco-services’ 
in the form of feral animal control, quarantine inspection, bush fi re management, and weed eradication 
programs. There is also potential to invest directly in commercial enterprises or indirectly in commercially 
valuable tradable assets, such as fi shing or crabbing licences. Such investment would not only generate 
market opportunity, but could also provide a future source of collateral for commercial loans. 
In the few locations where such a suite of activities does occur they are always founded on a robust 
organisational base with an entrepreneurial focus that has the wherewithal (or good luck) to employ 
qualifi ed, culturally astute, honest and ethical senior managers. Across the breadth of remote Australia, 
these few exceptions notwithstanding, the scale of missed commercial opportunities for development on 
Indigenous land is signifi cant.
One possible approach to meeting this challenge is to utilise a profi t-contingent loan or capped public 
investment mechanism to fi nance development opportunities on Indigenous land as generically proposed by 
Chapman and Simes (2004). The model we propose in this paper, based on a conjunction of state support, 
market-based incentives and projects that align with local aspirations, has the capacity to refl ect the reality 
of the hybrid economy outlined above. 
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THE MODEL: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
There is a range of issues to be considered in designing any such scheme. 
1. The institutional architecture governing development on Indigenous land nationally is legally 
complex, dynamic, and in a state of continuing fl ux. In particular, the NTA is only ten years old, and is 
still in the early stage of development in terms of case law and precedents. Any scheme will need to 
be administratively fl exible and versatile, and have the capacity to deal with different types of tenure 
and title, as well as the contingent nature of many Indigenous people’s native title rights, based as 
they are on claims which in many cases may be years away from being determined.
2. The Indigenous actors involved are heterogeneous, with diverse worldviews, contact histories, 
resource bases, and aspirations. They will wish to utilise different corporate vehicles, and work at 
different scales, from the individual and family level up to the regional level. Thus any general scheme 
will need to be fl exible and adaptable.
3. Indigenous landowners face particular problems in managing complex organisations that operate 
primarily in a western institutional context. Legitimate aspirations to maintain distinct customary 
prerogatives and institutions can in many respects be antithetical to established non-Indigenous 
norms of good corporate governance. The scheme must employ a strategy that builds on the 
undoubted capacities of Indigenous landowners in cultural and environmental management, while 
bolstering corporate and fi nancial management skills with help from outside. Community-controlled 
mediating organisations must be the site for managing these skills.
4. The incentive structures (both corporate and individual) created by any new program arrangements 
will be important determinants of success. Chapman and Simes (2004: 16) emphasise the need for all 
parties in a project to contribute fi nancially to minimise both ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’. 
In the case of Indigenous participation in any development program on their land, adverse selection 
might result in those least likely to succeed seeking public and private sector support. Hence it is 
important that Indigenous stakeholders share some of the fi nancial risk. Similarly, moral hazard 
might take the form of limited or low incentive to make an enterprise succeed or to repay loans. 
Again joint ownership of the project might increase the cost of failure and lower potential moral 
hazard problems. 
There are sound reasons for focusing on what Chapman and Simes (2004: 16) term ‘community based 
projects’, despite the problems that might potentially arise. The public good elements of commercial 
development on Indigenous land might justify public intervention to assist individual landowners and, 
in theory, this could be undertaken through an income-related loan mechanism. However, the practical 
diffi culties of identifying appropriate individual landowners and administering such a scheme in remote 
contexts, where land is generally inalienable and held by groups, rule it out as a feasible option in our view. 
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that the tax system could be used as an effi cient means to collect loans, especially 
given low individual capacity to pay.7
Current funding approaches in Indigenous affairs follow a similar model. They are generally based on grants 
to Indigenous corporations for particular purposes, with standard reporting and acquittal arrangements, 
but there is never enough funding available. In relation to sectors such as home loans and enterprise 
development where individuals are potential recipients, government has traditionally utilised loans with 
mixed success. In any case, these are relatively small programs.8
AN INDIGENOUS PROFIT-RELATED INVESTMENT SCHEME
In Indigenous affairs, governments have hitherto made no use of alternative funding models based on 
outsourcing to service providers on a competitive basis.9 The scheme we are proposing is based on just 
such an alternative and is modelled on a venture capital scheme, the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) 
Program currently administered by the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources. The IIF Program was 
introduced in 1998 to support commercialisation of innovation by small start-up fi rms (Ausindustry 2004). 
Through the IIF Program, the federal government has invested over $220 million in nine funds (an average 
of $24 million per fund) and has attracted $138 million in private investment. Total capital invested is $358 
million. The average fund size is almost $40 million.
Both the commercialisation of early stage innovation and the development of commercial opportunities 
on Indigenous land confront substantial market failure, but they have very different risk profi les. In the 
venture capital context, commercialisation of early stage innovation is highly risky, with very few start-up 
fi rms successfully surviving beyond infancy.10 However, the potential returns are extremely large, with most 
start-up fi rms targeting a share of a worldwide market. In contrast, the commercial risks of development 
involving established business models on Indigenous land are much lower (although still higher than for 
standard projects). The potential returns are also much lower, in most cases involving a maximum 15–25 
per cent return on capital, typical of most business opportunities in the economy.11 Locational and land 
access arrangements will generally mean that commercial projects on Indigenous land will have a degree of 
local monopoly power. The key point to note in this context is that the commercial risk profi le confronting 
government and potential private sector investors in supporting a scheme such as we propose is much lower 
than in the IIF program, but so too are the potential returns.
The scheme we propose takes as its obvious starting point the above-documented existence of market 
failure in relation to commercial investment on Indigenous land, and the public good rationale for investing 
in NCRM programs across the one-fi fth of the Australian continent under Indigenous ownership. It also 
addresses head-on the incentive problems and policy failure that have left Indigenous landowners amongst 
the poorest and most disadvantaged members of the Australian community. We propose that the federal 
government establishes a series of new funds for investment in partnership with Indigenous corporations 
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in commercial development projects on Indigenous land.12 There are two distinct roles for government in 
establishing such a scheme, fi rst as investor/risk underwriter, and second as a regulator.
As an investor, government would establish up to fi ve funds under a scheme we term the Indigenous Profi t-
Related Investment Program (IPRIP), with an initial tranche of $100 million. Fund managers chosen by select 
tender would manage each fund. They would raise or contribute between 10 and 30 per cent of the fund’s 
starting capital. The amount of private sector capital, the commercial and track record of the individuals 
seeking appointment as fund managers, and the range of expertise that they can call upon would all be 
taken into account in a rigorous selection process. At least half of the private sector capital should come 
from sources not associated with the fund manager. Government would contribute the balance, that is 
between 70 and 90 per cent of each fund’s capital base. Each fund would be required to invest in a number 
of commercial projects. It would be mandatory for each project to include a minimum Indigenous fi nancial 
equity holding of at least 30 per cent.13 Funds would have a fi nite life, say ten years, and would have to be 
wound up on a commercial basis at the expiry of that period. We expect that each fund would, on average, 
have around $30 million in total investor contributions.
We note that fi nancial resources are available to Indigenous interests for development on Indigenous 
land. Some groups of Indigenous landowners are the recipients of royalty payments arising from resource 
development projects on their land and from negotiated commercial agreements. There are also substantial 
investment accounts associated with both the New South Wales and Northern Territory land rights 
legislation.14 The ILC receives considerable draw-downs each year from the $1.3 billion Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Land Fund for land acquisitions and for land management.15 And individual Indigenous 
communities receive considerable capital and recurrent funding through programs such as the Community 
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme, that allow for employment on community projects. There 
are also a number of Indigenous development corporations in various parts of the country looking to invest 
in commercial projects.16 In our view there is substantial scope for many Indigenous interests to access 
fi nancial resources to participate in commercial development projects, particularly where those projects are 
underpinned by effective and proven private sector management structures.
Investments by a fund would be at the sole discretion of the fund manager, thus minimising the risks 
associated with political or bureaucratic involvement in the allocation of public subsidies for commercial 
development. It would also minimise the risk of ‘adverse selection’ for a profi t-related scheme, since the 
fund manager has substantial positive and negative incentives to wisely choose both potential projects and 
Indigenous partners. The decision to invest in particular projects would require prior commercial negotiations 
with relevant Indigenous landowners. A fund would never be the sole benefi ciary of a commercial project, 
though whether a fund would hold a controlling stake in a particular project would ultimately be determined 
by the outcome of commercial negotiations and the extent of any Indigenous partner investment. Clearly, a 
portion of Indigenous equity could be leveraged by providing access, heritage clearance or long-term leases 
rather than just from fi nancial investment.17
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At the conclusion of each fund’s term, the proceeds (less agreed fund manager’s fees contingent on 
performance) would be distributed on the following basis:
• Initial investments plus interest would be returned to government and private sector investors (on a 
pro rata basis if less than the initial investment but greater than zero—see Appendix B). 
• Any surplus profi ts over and above initial investments would be shared between government (10%) 
and the private investors (90%) to reward risk taking.
• The private investor component would be shared with the fund manager on an agreed basis as a 
performance incentive. 
Some hypothetical examples of the workings of the proposed scheme are provided at Appendix B, while 
a diagrammatic representation is provided at Appendix C. At this stage, we do not anticipate that profi t-
related loans would be repaid through the taxation system, but we do anticipate that profi ts would be 
shared on an annual basis on an equity basis between a fund (that would retain its profi ts) and Indigenous 
stakeholders. We would anticipate that projects that are going concerns after 10 years could be divested to 
Indigenous participants, although this would be subject to negotiation.
There would be a distinct regulatory role for government over and above its role as an investor under the 
IPRIP; this would be, essentially, to select and license fund managers and manage the licence agreements 
over the term of the fund. A sub-committee of the Industry Research and Development Board (IRDB), 
comprising business and academic members sourced from the research and development and innovations 
sector, oversees the IIF program. Serviced by a public service secretariat, the sub-committee brings a very 
hard commercial edge to the selection and oversight process for IIF program funds. In the case of IPRIP, it 
would be highly desirable to establish a similar mechanism with strong business sector involvement but with 
an additional range of Indigenous and non-Indigenous advisory expertise depending on each fund’s regional 
or industry focus.18
Government could target the funds’ operations in various ways, either through a geographic focus by region 
or State, or through an industry sector or thematic focus. Our view, at this stage, is that a broad focus on 
commercial development on Indigenous land would be appropriate. We see particular potential for projects 
with a NCRM focus, not least because this is where Indigenous landowners have a comparative advantage 
in terms of capacity, presence in remote localities, and a strong desire for involvement. There is also an 
emerging recognition in the science community that extant customary practice can be very effective in 
NCRM and especially in the management of wildfi re.
The advantage of the scheme we are proposing is that it provides a substantial incentive for private sector 
investment in commercial developments on Indigenous land, on a basis that directly involves landowners 
and respects their wishes. It places a fl oor under the size of any potential losses for private sector investors 
by making repayment of the government investment contribution—at least 70 per cent of the fund—
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contingent upon the fund’s commercial success within ten years. The incentive to defer profi ts under such 
an arrangement will be offset by the involvement of private sector and Indigenous landowner investors and 
a management fee structure directly linked to commercial performance. 
While not being prescriptive regarding the type of project to be pursued, the arrangements are designed 
to ensure that experienced, skilled and ethical managers, advised by other experts, professionally manage 
projects on a businesslike basis. At the same time the scheme aims to actively involve landowners as partners 
on whatever basis they have negotiated, to encourage Indigenous project ownership and reduce any 
potential moral hazard problem. A further indirect benefi t of the scheme will be the likelihood that fund 
managers and Indigenous interests will jointly identify further commercial opportunities on Indigenous land 
outside the ambit of the proposed scheme.
It is noteworthy that under the proposed scheme, there are two potential avenues for Indigenous involvement. 
The fi rst is as a partner or joint venturer with a fund in a particular project. It would be mandatory for each 
project supported by a fund to have such an Indigenous partner. The terms of the partnership will be based 
on a commercial negotiation, and must involve a fi nancial investment or contribution by the Indigenous 
corporation.19 The Indigenous interests will additionally benefi t indirectly from the subsidised expertise of 
the fund manager, as well as the commercial leverage derived from the knowledge that the fund manager 
must fi nd an Indigenous-owned commercial partner for each project (as well as other forms of leverage 
associated with land ownership or native title determination).
The second avenue available to Indigenous interests would be to contribute as a private investor in potential 
funds-seeking licences. Investments at this level could occur in myriad ways. For example, community or 
regionally-based Indigenous development corporations could use this avenue while being direct partners in 
a specifi c project.20 Government entities such as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund (and the 
ILC), Indigenous Business Australia,21 the Investment Fund created by the New South Wales Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act or the Aboriginals Benefi t Account in the Northern Territory could leverage considerably the value 
of the funds under their control. 
CONCLUSION
Innovation in policy development and policy-making is relatively rare in Australia. The normal modus 
operandi is incremental adjustment focused on solving or resolving specifi c policy problems or political 
issues. The relatively sudden emergence of major changes to the institutional architecture of land tenure in 
remote Australia has meant that a major gap in policy responses by governments has emerged, particularly 
in relation to commercial development and NCRM on the growing Indigenous estate. The major and growing 
challenges facing both governments and Indigenous communities in remote Australia deserve substantial 
attention by policy makers and analysts. The fact that the issues appear intractable suggests that it is time 
to consider innovative policy approaches and initiatives. 
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The scheme we have proposed, the Indigenous Profi t-Related Investment Program, would involve an initial 
tranche of around $100 million in government funding and would leverage in something approaching $50 
million in private and Indigenous sourced contributions. In contrast to existing funding for Indigenous 
related programs, these outlays can be conceptualised as a form of capped public investment, or a profi t-
related loan, with a signifi cant prospect of repayment to both public and private investors after ten 
years. The scheme would target a major policy gap with substantial positive externalities and public good 
elements both in the Indigenous development and NCRM areas. It would underwrite a signifi cant number of 
commercial development projects on Indigenous land with all the employment, income, and social esteem 
spin-offs that would fl ow from such outcomes.
The title of a recent book, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Moss 2002), 
summarises a part of our overarching argument. Indigenous economic development has failed thus far in 
remote and very remote Australia. In the last 30 years, with the transfer of large tracts of the Australian 
landmass back to Indigenous ownership, the risks associated with under-investment in natural and cultural 
resource mismanagement has also increased dramatically. The scheme we propose has, on one reading, low 
risk and low return, if return is defi ned in strict commercial terms. On another reading it has lower risk and 
very high return, if the return is defi ned more broadly to include both private Indigenous benefi t, public cost 
savings, and national and international positive externalities associated with better resource management 
on the Indigenous estate.
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NOTES
1. Hence its unalienated nature or historical reservation for Aboriginal use and consequently its more recent 
availability for claim.
2. This is not, of course, an argument for a shift from communal and inalienable to individual and private ownership 
of land. Besides the crucial issue of inter-generational equity in maintaining inalienability, there is no evidence 
that parcels of the Indigenous estate, mostly in remote regions, would provide adequate security as collateral for 
individual bank loans.
3. There are strong grounds for believing that market failure in relation to land tenure is a crucial component of 
under-development internationally and there is no reason to believe that this is not the case in Australia (De Soto 
2000; Pearson & Kostakidis-Lianos 2004).
4. For example, through the negotiation of Indigenous Land Use Agreements associated with resource developments 
under the native title statutory framework.
5. Such contestation can be linked to dispute within the Indigenous domain about traditional ownership that is a 
legacy of colonial administration, the forced movement of people, and voluntary migration. Self interest, or rent 
seeking, also arises as a source of confl ict.
6. Arguably constituting a form of moral hazard.
7. Unlike in the Higher Education Contributions Scheme (HECS) where there is a high likelihood of capacity to pay. 
Note that in the Child Support Scheme also administered through the tax system there can be contribution issues 
associated with capacity to pay (see Chapman 1997; Edwards 2001).
8. See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) (2003) for a summary of these programs and their 
performance.
9. The current federal government has indicated its intention to outsource its Indigenous legal services program 
under a competitive tender in the near future.
10. Emma Connors (2004) notes that of the nine funds backed under the IIF Program (fi ve established in 1998, four 
more in 2001), only two have returned any cash to the government; and only four of the 65 companies that 
secured funding have returned any money. See also Australian National Audit Offi ce (2002).
11. Given poor market linkage we assume that return on capital would be at the lower end of this range on the 
Indigenous estate.
12. We suggest the federal government because it underwrote the IIF Program; there is nothing precluding a joint 
federal/state partnership here, perhaps sponsored by the Council of Australian Governments under its Indigenous 
Economic Development Framework (Powers & Associates 2004).
13. This equity stake must not be grants based because of the risk of introducing adverse selection and moral hazard, 
although the role of a fund manager in overseeing the management of the fund would reduce the risk.
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14. See Altman (2002) for a recent summary. Currently, the Aboriginals Benefi t Account created by the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) holds reserves approaching $100 million ($82 million at 30 June 
2003) and the Investment Fund created by the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) has accumulated reserves 
estimated at $550 million. In both cases there are statutory restrictions on how these accumulated reserves can 
be used.
15. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund currently has accumulated reserves of $1.35 billion (ATSIC 
2003: 327); draw-down for the operations of the ILC was $54.7 million in 2003–04.
16. For example the recently established Indigenous Capital Limited. An Australian Indigenous Stock Exchange (ISX) 
was established in 2003 to facilitate the presentation of proposals by Indigenous entrepreneurs seeking investment 
capital; see <www.isx.org.au>. This could be a vehicle for Indigenous corporations to raise their fi nancial stake in 
a partnership from commercial or venture capital sources.
17. In particular this would be the case were Indigenous landowners to consider participating in a joint venture 
housing project on their land.
18. For example, an NCRM fund might seek suitable resource management expertise from both Western science and 
Indigenous ecological knowledge perspectives.
19. When we fi rst set out to write this paper we were focusing on the potential for such a scheme to provide 
funding to Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBCs). PBCs are corporations whose members comprise the holders of 
native title after a successful determination by the Federal Court. Under the NTA and subsequent administrative 
arrangements, PBCs are unfunded. While we regard this as a signifi cant public policy issue, we also believe that 
the scheme proposed here could both accommodate this problem and have wider applicability. 
20. For some corporations, investment both in a project and in one or several funds would provide a means to reduce 
commercial risk.
21. Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) is a statutory authority established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cwlth) that has an assets base of about $80 million, and that invests in small to 
medium sized joint ventures with Indigenous partners on a commercial loans basis (see IBA 2003).
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APPENDIX A: SOME EXAMPLES OF COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES ON INDIGENOUS 
LAND.
1. TRADE IN CARBON CREDITS 
The Arnhem Land Fire Abatement (ALFA) project, already informally underway, is looking to unite numerous 
traditional owners across 60,000 square kilometres of Arnhem Land to agree to early burning of their lands, 
both from the air and on the ground. This will result in an estimated abatement of 300,000 tonnes of carbon 
emissions when compared to unregulated burning. The scheme requires commercial underwriting for paying 
wages to on-ground community rangers who will undertake the burning, for aerial burning, for equipment 
and for sophisticated remote measurement of carbon abated. The scheme is predicated on future trading in 
carbon credits, already the subject of a futures market in Europe (see ‘Climate change: Welcome to Kyoto-
land’, The Economist, 9–15 October 2004: 59–61), but that will be contingent on Australia ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol. The benefi ts here will be local as well as global; there is emerging evidence that conservation 
biodiversity objectives are better served by landscape burning that approximates customary regimes 
(Williams & Russell-Smith 2003). And there is evidence that reducing late dry-season uncontrolled (and 
uncontrollable) fi res in the ALFA region will have health benefi ts and associated cost savings for residents of 
Darwin (Johnston et al. 2002). There is considerable scope for similar projects across large areas of northern 
Australia (including jointly managed national parks).
2. COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES ON JOINTLY MANAGED NATIONAL PARKS
The High Court decision in the Miriuwung-Gadjerrong native title claim held that many national parks and 
reserves in the Northern Territory had been invalidly alienated since 1975 thus making many existing parks 
available for claim under land rights legislation, which could potentially see them taken out of the parks 
estate. As a result, the Northern Territory government has offered Indigenous claimants joint management 
of 50 national parks and reserves. There are strong policy reasons, at both national and Territory levels, for 
ensuring that these national parks are well managed and that visitation opportunity is maximised. Yet many 
of these national parks have no or very limited physical infrastructure and very limited staffi ng. Investment 
in both, perhaps combining outsourced service delivery arrangements (e.g. sub-contracted ranger services 
and commercial concessions including guided tours, camping grounds, food and fuel outlets) could 
generate economic development opportunity for remote and disadvantaged regions. It is unlikely 
that profi table enterprises can be established in all, but a mix of local, public and private investment might 
provide the incentive to operate some profi table commercial concessions in some of the larger and more 
desirable destinations.
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3. TRADEABLE LICENCES
In Torres Strait the most valuable commercial fi sheries are prawning and pearl aquaculture, yet Islanders 
participate in neither. Under the Torres Strait Treaty, three commercial prawning licences have been reserved 
for Indigenous people, yet since 1985 none have been taken up. This is partly due to the very signifi cant 
fi nancial commitment needed to operate a prawn trawler. The reserved licences are not tradeable, but a mix 
of Islander, private and public investment could allow these concessions to be taken up and potentially sub-
leased or operated as joint ventures. Under the Torres Strait Treaty, expansion of any fi sheries in the Torres 
Strait Protected Zone is reserved for Islanders (Altman, Arthur & Bek 1994). 
4. UNDER-CAPITALISED ENTERPRISES
Many profi table enterprises on Aboriginal communities are under-capitalised. Capitalisation when it occurs 
is underwritten by state grants or by local consumers. For example, community stores have suffi cient positive 
cash fl ow to allow debt fi nancing of infrastructure, but the cost of commercial loans means either that 
investment capital is generated from savings or that loan repayment periods are very short term. A mix of 
profi t-related fi nancing from private, public and private sources might allow for a lower discount rate on 
investment that will result in a lower fi nancial burden on relatively poor customers who presently pay high 
store prices. This could have positive health and other benefi ts and create greater intergenerational equity. 
5. CULTURAL AND MAINSTREAM TOURISM
Some communities have opportunity for commercial joint ventures in recreational fi shing, safari hunting or 
cultural tourism enterprises, as well as in the provision of normal tourism sector services, but frequently lack 
the start-up equity to become more fully involved. There are examples of a high level of such engagement 
(e.g. Seisia community on Cape York Peninsula that has invested heavily in tourism infrastructure). Much 
of the leverage for such involvement comes from providing access-right concessions and mediating with 
land owners, but sources of project fi nance could place Indigenous stakeholders in a far stronger bargaining 
position, allowing them to gain a larger fi nancial stake in such regional developments, with ensuing 
employment and income benefi ts.
APPENDIX B. THREE HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF THE FINANCIAL 
WORKINGS OF THE PROPOSED IPRIP
              
Funding split [total] Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Govt/Private [net surplus/defi cit after administration fees]
Fund 1 18/5 [$23m] -4 -2 1 2 4 3 4 6 5 3 $22m surplus
Fund 2 24/6 [$30m] -2 -5 -2 0 -1 2 3 -2 1 -3 $9m loss
Fund 3 30/5 [$35m] -3 -3 0 2 2 4 6 6 4 6 $24m surplus
Total: 72/16 [$88m]
Fund 1 18/5 Initial investment returneda From surplus, government receives $2.2m From surplus, fund manager/private 
investors receive $19.8m
Fund 2 16.8/4.2 Initial investment returned on a 
pro-rata basisa
No surplus distribution No surplus distribution
Fund 3 30/5 Initial investment returneda From surplus, government receives $2.4m From surplus, fund manager/private 
investors receive $21.6m
Total: 64.8/14.2 From surplus, government receives $4.6m From surplus, fund manager/private 
investors receive $41.4m
Note: (a) For the sake of simplicity, we have ignored the interest component that would be added to the fi nal distribution and have limited the hypothetical examples to 
three rather than fi ve funds.
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APPENDIX C. DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSED IPRIP
Notes:
(a) Depending on relative 
equity of fund and 
Indigenous partners.
(b) Our scheme does not 
address the availability 
of these funds except to 
acknowledge that funding 
sources exist for good 
proposals.
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